In this report Andrei Yeliseyeu analyzes Belarus’s pre-election campaign period, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s election campaign and his domestic political priorities, and examines Belarus’s political regime transformation towards personalist military rule. The study also reviews the dynamics of the Belarus-Russia relationship, and discusses probable scenarios for the near Belarus’s political future.
Some of the report’s highlights include:
◉ In the absence of independent sociology in Belarus, assumptions concerning Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s approval rating are based on indirect indicators. Over the past years, circumstantial evidence suggested a growing public mistrust toward the Belarusian authorities and Lukashenka personally. It manifested itself in people’s absenteeism at the 2nd European Games events in 2019, a completely “politically sterile” 2019 Belarusian parliament, a growing censorship on the internet and propaganda component in the state-owned media, etc.
◉ The presidential administration’s expectation to have non-emotional elections of the type seen in 2015 failed to materialize due to the increased political mobilization. It was caused by economic grievances and exacerbated by inadequate response to the coronavirus epidemic clearly attributable to Lukashenka and his ruling coalition. The coronavirus epidemic began developing in Belarus in early March, exactly when the more active phase of Lukashenka’s election campaign began to unfold.
◉ Despite various tricks by the Belarusian authorities to convince the population of the opposite, during the 2020 election campaign an increasingly larger part of Belarusian society began to realize that Lukashenka’s opponents are in a majority. By late April, Lukashenka faced a stark new political reality after high electoral support of his main political opponents became very clear. Amid an unprecedented political mobilization, Lukashenka’s election campaign took vague forms and became rather reactive. It proved to be proactive only in the part of repressive actions.
◉ To forestall a growing political mobilization of the population, since April the Belarusian ruler prioritized a campaign of repression and discrediting the most popular political opponents, intimidation of civilian population, and actions to ensure a larger control over information flows, including through reprisals against popular bloggers. While a number of factors, primarily historically lowest level of public’s trust, make Lukashenka’s ongoing election campaign most challenging, he benefits from the unprecedented concentration of power and strength of the security apparatus.
◉ Based on the approach that differs from the existing practice of creating categorical typologies of autocratic regimes, one can speak about the recent, or rather ongoing evolution of Belarus’s political regime to a personalist military type. Under the military not only the army, but security bodies and other law-enforcement agencies may be thought to include. The appointment of KGB Major General Ihar Siarheyenka as the head of the presidential administration in December 2019 was an important milestone in Belarusian authoritarianism’s transformation towards a personalist military rule. The influence of persons specialized in the use of force in the Belarus’s ruling coalition increased even more after the June 2020 government reshuffle. A ‘civilian’ component in Lukashenka’s ruling coalition has never been as sidelined from decision-making processes as it is now.
◉ A growing political mobilization and heightened repressions in Belarus, and hence worsening relations with the West, increase the probability of a new Lukashenka’s integration package with Russia in exchange for Kremlin’s political and economic support. After a series of public squabbles between Belarusian and Russian officials over the response to the coronavirus pandemic in the spring of 2020, a dialogue over deeper integration intensified in June.
◉ An unprecedented concentration of power allows Lukashenka to unilaterally control the organization, monitoring, and adjudication of elections. Minsk’s refusal to invite OSCE / ODIHR observers points to the Belarusian authorities’ plans to announce another Lukashenka’s devastating victory, without any regard for real voting results. A vast electoral fraud is very likely, and it remains to be seen how massive civil disobedience and dynamics of opposition mobilization capacity will be.
◉ The two most important factors for the further development of the political situation in Belarus will be the Kremlin’s position and the level of opposition mobilization capacity. The West’s actions will hardly be decisive given its very limited leverage over the situation in Belarus. In the event of limited mobilization capacity with no genuine revolutionary threat, Lukashenka will get more maneuverability in negotiations with Moscow. If, despite the efforts of repressive apparatus, the opposition’s mobilization capacity remains high and massive acts of civil disobedience take place, the likelihood of a new Belarus’s integration deal with Russia will increase exponentially.
◉ It is a plausible, though not inevitable, scenario that the Belarusian population will be coerced towards a new reality of a deeper integration with Russia under the continuous rule of Lukashenka, even in the situation of his record low approval rating. Moscow will unlikely play a risky game and bet on any alternative political force in Belarus, if only Lukashenka’s position becomes extremely weakened. At the same time, the odds of success for deliberate strategies of any major actor will lengthen in the light of quickly evolving circumstances and imperfect information.
